Reading the Signals: Why the Taiwan Strait Is Moving Toward Crisis

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Over the weekend of December 7-8, Chinese military operations near Japan’s Okinawa islands dramatically escalated. On Saturday, Chinese fighter jets directed their fire-control radar at Japanese military aircraft on two separate occasions. By Monday, China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier had conducted approximately 100 take-offs and landings in the same waters.

Japan’s Defense Minister called the incidents “dangerous” and lodged a formal protest. Australia’s Defence Minister, meeting with his Japanese counterpart in Tokyo, expressed being “deeply concerned.” The US ambassador to Japan offered support through social media. But President Trump remained silent.

That silence matters. Because this incident, viewed in isolation, might seem like just another flare-up in the ongoing tensions between China and its neighbors. But it’s not isolated. It’s part of a carefully orchestrated sequence that reveals something more significant: the strategic window for Chinese military action against Taiwan is closing, and multiple independent factors are converging on the same narrow timeframe—roughly February through May of next year.

What Fire-Control Radar Actually Means

When a military aircraft points its fire-control radar at another plane, it’s not a warning shot. It’s the targeting system locking on before a missile is fired. In peacetime, using this radar against another military’s aircraft is considered a severe escalation because it signals immediate hostile intent and may force the targeted aircraft to take evasive action—creating the exact conditions for accidents that spiral into conflict.

China has done this before. In 2013, a Chinese warship locked fire-control radar on a Japanese destroyer in the East China Sea. But what’s notable about Saturday’s incidents is the deliberate repetition: two separate events on the same day, signaling not a tactical mistake but an intentional establishment of a new normal.

Each time an incident like this produces only diplomatic protests—no costs, no consequences—it becomes the new baseline. Fire-control radar targeting, normalized, collapses the response time Japan would have in any Taiwan contingency. It’s not about testing whether Japan will respond (Japan must respond). It’s about testing whether the United States will back Japan’s response.

The Pattern Emerges

To understand Saturday’s incidents, you need to look at what happened in the weeks leading up to them. Between November 14 and December 3, the United States, Japan, and Taiwan executed a remarkably compressed sequence of coordinated actions:

November 14: The US Marine Corps activated Combat Logistics Battalion 4 at Camp Schwab, Japan—a unit specifically designed for “agile logistics capable of quickly equipping units across the Indo-Pacific.” On the same day, Trump approved a $330 million arms sale to Taiwan, his first of his second term.

November 24: Trump spoke with Chinese President Xi Jinping by phone. Trump stated that “the U.S. understands how important the Taiwan question is to China.” He also accepted Xi’s invitation to visit Beijing in April 2026.

November 25: Japan announced the deployment of Type 03 Chu-SAM medium-range surface-to-air missiles to Yonaguni Island—just 110 kilometers from Taiwan—with completion scheduled for March 31, creating what amounts to an automatic tripwire for any Taiwan conflict.

November 30: Taiwan’s government released a detailed report on Chinese military infrastructure construction along the eastern coast: five major bases, expanded airbases, a helicopter facility, and a 50% increase in missile inventory over four years.

December 3: Taiwan’s President Lai, observing reservist training, stated publicly that “peace cannot be achieved through a mere piece of paper” and “without sufficient strength, reconciliation will degenerate into surrender.”

This wasn’t routine deterrence building. This was a coordinated response to shared intelligence. The timing reveals the game: the Marine logistics battalion activated on November 14 will be operationally ready in exactly 4-5 months—late March to early April. You don’t activate specialized logistics units with that kind of precision unless you have specific intelligence about a timeline.

Four days after this deterrence architecture was completed, China directed fire-control radar at Japanese aircraft. This was the probe. This was China testing whether the deterrence is real or theater.

The Constraint Analysis

The question isn’t whether China wants to take military action against Taiwan. The question is whether structural constraints are eliminating alternatives to the point where action becomes rational within the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic framework, despite sub-optimal conditions.

Multiple independent constraint timelines are converging:

The Rare Earth Timeline: China currently controls roughly 90% of the processing capacity for rare earth minerals—materials critical to advanced weapons systems, precision-guided munitions, and electronics. The United States has been critically dependent on Chinese supply. But that’s changing. By mid-2026, a network of alternative sources will become operational: MP Materials’ magnet facility in Texas, Lynas’s processing plant, and expanded separation capabilities in California, with Australian projects following in 2027.

This creates a binary timeline: before mid-2026, China retains economic leverage through potential rare earth cutoffs. After mid-2026, that leverage evaporates permanently. The United States will be able to sustain military operations independently and impose comprehensive sanctions without self-inflicted supply chain damage.

This isn’t a policy variable. It’s a mathematical constraint that eliminates Chinese options after the window closes.

Military Infrastructure: Taiwan’s November 30 report wasn’t propaganda—it cited satellite intelligence showing Chinese military construction with specific completion timelines. The Shanghai naval base with underground fuel storage, the Zhejiang wharf facilities, the expanded airbases at Fuzhou and Xiamen—these are scheduled to be operational in February and March 2026, with full testing completed by late March.

Infrastructure built for specific timelines signals specific plans, not open-ended future capabilities.

Food Security: Under the Trump-Xi trade agreement, China committed to importing 12 million metric tons of soybeans from the United States between November 2025 and January 2026. Ships are loading now and will arrive in China through January and early February. This puts Chinese strategic food reserves at maximum levels in January-February 2026—right before any action would need to occur.

The timing is precise: action in late March or early April happens after food reserves are secured but before new purchases would be needed. It’s a perfect food security window.

US Force Posture: The United States currently has over 15,000 personnel deployed in the Caribbean and around Venezuela as part of what the administration calls counter-narcotics operations. The USS Gerald R. Ford, an aircraft carrier, has been stationed there since November 16. FAA restrictions for the operation run through March 31, 2026.

This creates both a distraction (US attention and resources committed elsewhere) and a deadline (forces become available for Pacific deployment after March 31).

When Windows Close, Actors Choose Imperfect Timing

Historical pattern recognition matters here. When strategic windows close, actors often choose sub-optimal preparation over no action at all:

The mathematics are straightforward: 75% preparation during favorable conditions can be worth more than 100% preparation under unfavorable conditions. China’s military is currently assessed at roughly 75-80% optimal preparation for a Taiwan operation. But if the window closes—if rare earth alternatives become operational, if Japanese missiles are integrated, if Taiwan’s urban warfare capabilities continue improving—then 100% preparation becomes meaningless.

Window closure creates a forcing function that overrides preparation optimization.

The Indigenous Framework Error

Western analysts often make a critical mistake when assessing Chinese decision-making: they assume “rational” means “economically optimal.” But from the CCP’s perspective, the optimization function is different. Party survival comes before economic efficiency. Taiwan reunification isn’t a policy preference—it’s framed as a civilizational mission tied to regime legitimacy.

From the CCP’s indigenous framework, accepting permanent strategic disadvantage on Taiwan is ideologically impossible. Success in military action strengthens regime legitimacy. But even failure can be spun as “besieged by foreign enemies,” preserving the party’s narrative. Only inaction—allowing the strategic window to close without attempting reunification—creates an unmanageable legitimacy problem.

This is why China’s response to routine Japanese statements in November was so disproportionate. When Japan’s Prime Minister warned that Japan might respond to Chinese military action against Taiwan if it threatened Japanese security, China didn’t issue a routine protest. It paused seafood imports and advised citizens not to travel to Japan. That’s an unprecedented overreaction to a fairly standard statement.

Unless it’s not an overreaction. Unless China recognized that Japan just created an automatic tripwire that fundamentally complicates any near-term operational planning.

What Trump’s Strategy Actually Reveals

There’s been considerable speculation about whether Trump’s accommodating language toward China on Taiwan represents actual policy or strategic theater. The answer is in the actions, not the words.

Throughout 2025, the Trump administration has:

These aren’t the actions of an administration planning to abandon Taiwan. These are the actions of an administration following intelligence assessments and military recommendations while maintaining verbal flexibility for negotiating purposes.

The Marine logistics timing alone proves this. That level of precision—4-5 months from activation to operational readiness, perfectly aligned with the constraint convergence window—doesn’t happen by accident. It happens when intelligence drives planning.

The Odds and What to Watch

Is conflict in the February-May 2026 timeframe certain? No. But the probability is high. Multiple independent constraint timelines converging on the same narrow window creates compound probability, not single-variable speculation.

The odds are elevated further by the fact that China has now entered an active probe phase. Saturday’s radar incidents test the deterrence architecture that was erected in November. Each successful probe that produces only diplomatic protest establishes a new baseline and raises the likelihood of continued escalation.

Watch for these indicators in the coming months:

Military signals: Changes in Chinese aircraft carrier deployment patterns, particularly the Liaoning, Shandong, and the newly commissioned Fujian. Increased frequency of amphibious exercises. Missile force mobilization.

Economic signals: Chinese semiconductor stockpiling (advance purchases beyond normal needs). Changes in rare earth export patterns. Implementation of capital controls. Unusual reserve accumulation.

Diplomatic signals: Overreactions to routine statements—the intensity of response often reveals operational sensitivity. Preparation or cancellation signals around the April Beijing summit. Compressed timelines for allied coordination meetings.

Operational signals: Frequency and severity of gray-zone incidents. Attempts to normalize increasingly aggressive acts. Information operations intensity. Cyber activity patterns.

What This Means

The December 7 radar incidents weren’t random gray-zone pressure. They were China’s probe of a deterrence architecture that was erected based on intelligence assessment of a specific action window. The probe tested a simple question: is the deterrence real, or is it theater?

Trump’s silence provided an answer.

What happens next depends on variables that remain genuinely uncertain: China’s assessment of whether the costs of action (urban warfare in Taiwan, Japanese automatic involvement, potential US intervention) outweigh the costs of inaction (permanent strategic disadvantage, rare earth leverage elimination, regime legitimacy questions).

But the structural constraints are clear. The window exists. The timelines converge. The infrastructure will be ready. The reserves will be full. And the alternatives that would eliminate China’s leverage will become operational by mid-2026.

When windows close, history shows that actors often choose to act during the window rather than accept permanent disadvantage. The question isn’t whether the window exists—observable facts and physical constraints confirm it does. The question is whether China will choose to use it.

Based on the patterns, the probabilities, and the probes, the signals point toward crisis. Not certainty, but high probability. Not speculation, but constraint-based analysis grounded in observable facts and historical patterns.

The next few months will tell us whether deterrence holds or whether the constraints force action. Either way, the strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait has fundamentally changed. The question is no longer whether there’s a window. The question is whether it will be used.

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— Free to share, translate, use with attribution: D.T. Frankly (dtfrankly.com)

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